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Abstract. By the fall of Communism, also the past of Central and Eastern Europe is mostly hold eradicated, albeit 
it cannot but steadily survive in sublated mentality. On the fi eld of l aw, this is expressed by the continuity of text-
centrism in approach to law, with the law’s application following the law’s letters in a quasi-mechanical way. 
Consequently, what used to be legal nihilism in the Socialist regime has turned into the law’s textual fetishism in 
the meantime. This is equal to saying that facing the dilemma of weighing between apparently contradictory ideals 
within the same Rule of Law, justice has in fact been sacrifi ced to the certainty in/of the law in the practical 
working of the judiciary. Especially, constitutional adjudication mostly works for the extension of individual rights 
while the state as the individuals’ community is usually blocked in responding challenges in an operative manner. 
Situation in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Baltic Republics, as well as Croatia is surveyed through a 
series of case studies in order to show degrees and variations of worsening. Softening the law by activating 
juridical inventiveness was used to be pressed on the region during her preparation to accession, a practice that has 
now been counteracted by stiffening hard law anew. In either case, on the last resort, phase-lag of juridical 
mentality in the region may have been at stake, preserved at the stage what Western Europe could develop into 
when reconstruction after the end of WWII started. For post-war West’s new joiners in approach and methodology 
– like (1) natural law considerations; (2) balancing among interests through assessing them in light of general 
principles and clauses, either of the law or implied by its underlying legal culture; as well as (3) constitutionalisation 
of issues – have remained mostly esoteric ideas, alien in mass to the region in question. The damage this condition 
may cause by cumulation is an added burden on the popular receptivity of catch-words heralded, among other 
ideals, by the Rule of Law.
Keywords: erasing the past, mechanical jurisprudence, constitutional court activism, regional phase lag, 
functioning as a big-organisation, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, the Baltics, Croatia
1. A FRESH NEW START
The schemes of mapping legal families had to break with the continuation of a past with the 
Central and Eastern European region regarded as somewhat distinct and particular, when 
Socialism as a regime was eradicated from the European scenario. All this looked like a 
magical act: as if the political downfall of a dictatorship, instituted and sustained through a 
Красная Армия [Red Army] imperialist occupation, were able to generate an overall 
change. In any case, for the present-day mapper “The ‘socialist legal family’ is dead and 
buried, and although it will take a long time to erase the traces of more than forty years of 
total subjection to political ideology, it seemed right to discard the chapters on socialist 
law.” (Kötz 1998: v) This is to say that one has started waiting for some miracle again, or, 
otherwise expressed, for a setting of mind usual in so-called “honeymoon periods”, but now 
missing the traces characteristic of a revolution (cf. Sorokin 1965). Such Utopianism is 
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manifested by simplistic opinions, according to which, for instance, “Polish law belongs to 
the western legal tradition, its laws for historical and cultural reasons belonging to the 
Germanic and Romanistic legal families. This infl uence survives strongly to this day, 
notwithstanding a 50-year period of submission to the so-called ‘socialist family’ [...]. For 
the last sixteen years the country’s laws have been in a state of constant fl ux, fi rst in order 
to divorce, practically overnight, its ‘socialist family’ in favour of a marriage more proper 
for a market economy, and second, as soon as Poland’s entry into the European Union 
became a feasible option, to meet the requirements of the acquis communautaire.” (Stroiński 
2006: 39) Under such conditions, monographic overviews and historical outlines introducing 
text-books on the formation of institutions can pass over half of a century without further 
notice; quite as if there were nothing interfering with, or interrupting, pre-WWII 
development. Accordingly, local institutions may elegantly be traced back to their 
origination in Roman law, the French revolution or interwar events, with no mention of 
further possible determinants which can have survived from the practice just left behind 
yesterday, as a proper legacy. As items belonging to such a legacy, prime mention should be 
done to the skill of the legal profession, thoroughly educated and socialised in the spirit of 
its time, that is, equipped with a mentality fully interiorised and practiced (Mańko 2007: 
87). This is to say that waiting for a miracle in such a way is hardly else than the symbolic 
re-assertion of discontinuation itself: the gesture of clearing away the past.
No need to say that, from a theoretical point of view, such a stand is mistaken from the 
beginning. It presupposes mechanical understanding that reduces law to some positivated 
materiality or, at least, quasi-physicality (cf. Varga 2007). For instance, it would presume 
the mere textual building of – by institutionalising one or two further principles and 
provisions in – an overall regulation, in order that it can represent a brand new S1 system. It 
is as if law, as an instance of so called big organisations, were nothing but mere virtuality of 
notional aggregates, free to shape in a sheerly artifi cial environment, claiming treatment as 
a (quasi)axiomatic system. As to such breaking off continuity, only scrutiny will show that 
artifi cial eradication will have in fact used to serve nothing else than emphasising transition 
itself.1
II. WITH PAST EXTENDED
There is a polar dynamism in the development of the European Union, defi ning a reverse 
tension between its growing expansion and the deepening of integration achieved 
(Bengoetxea 1993: vii). For communitarianism, equalling to dedicating some of our past 
property to shared purposes, necessarily induces refl exes and institutes mechanisms of self-
defence. In everyday co-existence they may wane to a considerable degree but, with the 
trap of (or zigzagging between) conformism and non-conformism, they tempt at double-
dealing, by-pass, and pretended implementation as well.
This means that harmonisation within the European Community is fulfi lled at the level 
of domestic law drafted and posited, but in every further respect, separation, with own 
interests pushed in hardly veiled competition with the rest is steadily continued. At the same 
time the auto-operation of the European Union – which in itself is not co-ordinated or 
1 The cumulation of changes “does not mean that the former socialist countries do not form, at 
least temporarily, a geopolitical or legal-geographical unit. [...] The similarity, in turn, forms a new 
subject of comparative law, ie, the method of transformation or substitution of socialist law by new 
law”. (Knapp 1995: 532)
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harmonised but randomly cumulated, so chaotic to a considerable depth, when it issues 
accidental masses of directives and judicial statements in daily repetition, which will be 
somewhat acknowledged and partly also implemented, but in endless variations, by the 
addressee member states – generates tensions to which those addressed will react in their 
own manner, that is, opting for an alternative covering their own interest as drawn from 
their own tradition.
As to the basic setting, superimposition of Community law upon domestic regimes is 
like the constitutionalisation of issues: both are to pave divergent paths with concurrent and 
pluralising channels of reasoning. For “Directives [...] can always be invoked before 
national courts in order to produce a ‘concurring’ interpretation of national law. Their 
provisions can be enforced against national law when they are suffi ciently clear to be 
directly effective, but only vis-à-vis national authorities.” Moreover, “even where a real 
discretion has been allowed, the limits set to that discretion by Community law can in 
principle be invoked before the national courts” – considering the fact that “no discretion 
[...] can be exempt from legal review, each discretion having its limits”. So, this is to say 
that “Indeed, Community law has to be applied by the national court, whenever it can be 
applied as a rule of law.” (Timmermans 1979: 554, 555)
Well, old partners of the European Community have since long signalled that with the 
Rule of Law criterion set by the German Constitutional Court – sticking security in law, 
plain language, as well as guaranteeing legitimate civil expectations as a sine qua non 
minimum required as to fi ll what Rechtsstaatlichkeit presupposes2 – applied, European law 
would have at once collapsed.3
European law is blamed to be vague and untransparent because of the random 
superimposition of new and new positivations (directives and decisions) without any clear 
internal system and hierarchy (Bieber–Salomé 1996);4 to undermine the coherence and 
prevalent systemicity of domestic private law regimes (i.e., their code regulations and 
background doctrines) by its ad hoc character (Hommelhoff 1992: 102), as well as notional 
incoordination and elusive nature (Grundmann 2000),5 characteristic of the mass of 
incoming European interventions; to menace the stability of domestic legal regimes by the 
unendingly massive production of such interventions (Oppetit 1990: 3); to transform its 
own self, by the unmanaged simultaneous complexity and rigour of the Community’s 
normative production, into the drawback, moreover, the problem itself, of any progress in 
economic development and the free movement of persons and goods, because, as established 
by the Commission in 1994, the hyperactive operation of the Union is blocking, by 
interfering with, the competitiveness of transactions performed within its reach (Burns 
1997). What is more, by now disintegrative moments in, and tendencies of, the Community 
law and order to break it up, may overcome the impression prevailing for a half of a century, 
2 BVerfGE 5 No. 7, Apothekenstoppgesetz, 1956.
3 “Luckily for all of us, the [German Constitutional] court did not repeat that particular heresy: 
transferred to the Community level, it would probably leave us with a very limited number of 
regulations that could pass the test.” (Koopmans 1985: 15)
4 The criticism is subsequently generalised in four directions such as “the evolutionary nature of 
the pillar system, the originality of the integration model, the lack of coherence in legislative 
production and the inaccessibility of European law”. (Bieber–Amarelle 1998: 19) Facing tensions, 
quantitative out-put reduction through a better quality of in-put work is proposed (Piris 2004).
5 Accordingly, “the pointillistic character of such norm-generation is gradually ever more 
destructive of a concept of law based on the ideal of codifi cation”. (Köbler 1993: 307)
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namely, that the law of, and the integration within, the European Union go on hand in hand 
(Hunt–Shaw 2009).
For the law of the European Union is like – as symbolised (Pennington 1994; Varga 
2009) by – the solar system: bipolar indeed, with sun and its planetary dependents in a 
mutual pre-disposition, in which any non-systemic action, if strong enough, can/could 
explode the whole system. Each sub-system reacts in its own way, but all that 
notwithstanding, the overall outcome of this characteristically big-organization will be 
order out of chaos as a statistical average of the total motion considered. Accordingly, the 
mass of new impetuses the centre activates endlessly will have a defi nite impact with its 
eventually channelling and curative effect. Moreover, independently of how much all this is 
alien to the in-built spirit of domestic law, schemed after the past pattern of positivism, this 
heralds the new idealisation in sociology/anthropology as well. That is, breaking with the 
godly order – as generalised in Newton’s causality, in which God’s and humans’ commands 
were issued and followed/transgressed in endless repetitions, now society is seen as the 
statistical end-product of individual moves and actions, atomised in the latter’s individual 
contexture. And like in case of so-called Brownian motion, some orderliness will be seen in 
what is – microscopically observing – just mass anarchy (Reynolds 1994: 373).
From old times in legal history it is known that such reconsiderations have been 
usually followed by periods of consolidation. This new empiredom with fi ve hundred 
millions of inhabitants in the European Union now seems to be an exception. True, there 
are momentous works in re of harmonisation and preparing ambitious projects directed to 
common codifi cation, but their basic intention is just the opposite: instead of consolidating 
the law in force, they aim at expanding the Community law to growingly new terrains, not 
foreseen by the “pillars” of the founding Treaty of the European Union.
Member states are helpless by the inconsideration of the legal machinery of the 
European Union, knowing and experiencing that “Both the drafted text and the 
implementation of the normative message of the Union’s laws risk to generate a number of 
islands alien to the legal system of the receptive state; and, in consequence, they hazard the 
internal coherence of domestic law and the laws received, and thereby also the co-ordinated 
operation of the system itself.” (Harmathy 2001: 128) Interestingly enough, some years ago 
Hungarian literature urged the fi nalisation of the preparation (after deepened doctrinal 
elaboration achieved) of her new Civil Code (February 11, 2013) just as the last bastion to 
defend the national law’s internal coherence from those constraints of the automatism of 
Community law implementation able to break it up, on an especially sensitive fi eld of 
national existence and productive activity within the range of it.
Albeit there is no express provision obliging member-states judiciary to follow the 
Community interpretation and to accept the direct force of the decisions of the European 
Court, the state is liable for violation of Community law, provided that domestic court 
decision is “in manifest breach of the case law of the Court in that matter”.6
This is why it is so striking to consider the recurrent cases of the harsh openness of a 
member-state’s self-protection, caring for national prestige and the weigh of domestic fora 
alike.
For instance, hardly four decades ago, one of the pioneers of the European Community 
idea, France, nullifi ed an administrative court ruling in a process initiated by her minister of 
internal affairs, based upon the own domestic statement on the state of laws according to 
6 C-224/01 Köbler (2003) ECR I-10239, 56.
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which “Directives cannot be invoked by citizens only for helping with normative grounds 
their objection to an individual administrative act.”7 Moreover, such a preference of national 
supremacy to any Communitarian ethos was substantiated by a former Conseil d’État 
statement, ruling out of the “bloc of constitutionality” anything beyond the national law’s 
boundaries, that is, beyond the criteriality exclusively relevant for assessment of norm 
conformism, inclusive of constitutionalism as well.8 One decade ago, the same Conseil 
constitutionnel [the former’s successor] rejected posterior constitutional adjudication of 
four laws transforming European directives into domestic law, by one single – concisely 
drafted – argument: “the transformation of any Community directive into national law 
concludes from a constitutional requirement that can only be denied by another, expressedly 
reverse provision of the Constitution. In want of such a provision, the Community judge 
has exclusive competition controlling that...”.9 It is not by chance therefore that France is 
repeatedly and continually judged by the European Court for missing the transposition of 
Community directives into the domestic regime of the Code civil10 and for deepening the 
stigma of “national disinterest” (Nourissat 2007: 246). This sensitive relationship is not 
cleared up to date; or, what is more, it is not faced in depth indeed (Richards 2006).
III. ENDING IN JURISPRUDENCE WITH PRE- AND POST-ACCESSION 
REQUIREMENTS HOMOLOGISED
It is relatively rare opportunity to have reports on changes in mentality and skill of courts, 
the legal profession, moreover, the jurisprudence of the part of ex-Socialism, now ordinary 
members of the European Union. Furthermore, such reports are mostly one-sided: either 
self-satisfi ed, prophesising complete transubstantiation with no problem encountered, or 
fully outraged, with new generations willing to speed up overcoming belatedness. The 
latter’s exaggeration leads to, among others, voluntary advancement of the obligation of 
harmonisation to a date prior to actual accession, sharply criticising authorities’ lawful 
reaction as dated antiquity when resistance is met.
There are, of course, states which are pathological of a soci(ologic)al setting: backward, 
and/or belated. These are instable themselves, positioned at the crossing of transitory paths. 
There is a variety of them: practice may detach from manifested principles; therapy may be 
needed in self-protection, by making authoritarian past elements to survive; as a by- or 
after-effect, original intention of what to cure by instituting Rule of Law may fade away. 
Anyhow, the dilemma has to be faced whether law is made up simply of normative 
positivations just projected into the air or it is the law’s environment that enforces – by 
7 Conseil d’État (22 December 1978) Cohn-Bendit.
8 74-1954 DC (15 January 1975).
9 2004-496 DC (10 June 2004), considérant 7; 2004-497 DC (1 July 2004), considérant 18; 
2004-498 DC (29 July 2004), considérant 4; 2004-499 DC (29 July 2004), considérant 7, published 
in http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/
decisions-depuis-1959/2004/2004-496-dc/decision-n-2004-496-dc-du-10-juin-2004.901.html.
10 C-52/00 Commission c/France, Rec. I-3827 (25 April 2002), then C-177/04 Commission c/ 
France, Rec. I-000 (14 March 2006).
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implementing its dynamei – order in some way. If the fi rst option is the case, the law’s 
genuine force (its last reserve) is weakened; in the second one, there is a proper use of the 
law’s genuine strength, sustained by ongoing social practice.
The Context
Foundational role is usually attributed to the survival of legal positivism, mainstream 
organising idea that once transfi gured from continental pre-WWII textual or rule-positivism 
into so-called Socialist normativism in the entire region. It is a syndrome called 
“textocentrism” that originates from it (Łętowska 1997). This is a continuation of the 
methodological legacy of German Pandectism, stiffened by the positivistic doctrinarism of 
the Muscovite style of Marxising achieved on the fi eld of law.
As to the role of judiciary, the dated approach treating justices as mere 
Subsumptionsautomaten is unchanged haunting. As an apodictic sentence testifi ed to it four 
and a half decades ago, “The task of the judiciary is not creation but application of legal 
norms, to given social relations. This holds to all kind of judiciary, including the Supreme 
Court as well.” (Wolter 1968: 64) This explains why general provisions of law using 
evaluative or fl exible concepts – stated as principles, value-statements or clauses – have not 
much chance of being referred to by the courts in the region.
Tradition is always Janus-faced. Socialist legal policy rejected Generalklauseln – 
inserted in the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1896), for instance – as subversive 
Kautschukparagraphen, good only to hide “class contents” of the bourgeois law, but 
opening the gate for both unrestrained discretion and avoidance of the law (Szer 1962: 25). 
Instead, it postulated “social co-existence” as a sine qua non principle (Nowacki 1957), 
requiring that rights are allowed to be used according to their socio-economic purpose only. 
Thereby the use of rights became a function of prevailing state ideology, changing by timely 
needs of political interpretation of what the “message” of Marxism–Leninism should be. 
Or, political considerations were channelled into formal legal processes so as to be able to 
determine their outcome, opening gates to any option if needed.11
Over-politicisation of law was built in both the education and socialisation of the 
judiciary, made to harmonise with – as concluding from – their basically positivistic spirit. 
As a conclusion, no judge was either encouraged or prepared to thinking in principles and 
confl icted interests, or balancing among contrasted values. Over-politicisation as external 
force met the participants’ internal need of individual self-protection and their pressurised 
self-submission in perverted forms of mechanical jurisprudence: applying law according to 
its letters. Such mentality pervaded administration of justice as a whole. All in all, transition 
from somewhere to somewhere else has remained for long just a lip service, only good for 
rhetorical use.12
As an effect, the sense of institutional autonomy, on the one hand, and the one of the 
responsibility to be borne for the decision made, on the other, equally evaporated. Soulless 
11 Six decades ago, the Polish Supreme Court rejected the claim of a private owner against a 
state enterprise whose interest should be given priority. ŁC 495/50 (9 May 1950), published in 
Państwo i Prawo VI (1951) 2, 327–.
12 “The belief that in order to change the world one must fi rst and foremost change regulations 
and then the rest will automatically take care of itself is an expression of similar thinking based on a 
belief in the magical force of the law. We have a state of law in the constitution, and so we irrevocably 
will also have one in life.” (Łętowska–Łętowski 1996: 10)
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mass servicing in a daily routine was to substitute to the skill of balancing. Almost automatic 
exacting of the law became the fashion of the day, with no readiness for facing the pressure 
of actual challenges or use feedback channels. Outer observers, especially those sensitive to 
transparent forecalculability in business affairs, were only shocked to experience that with 
some (whatever) reference to any (relevant/irrelevant) legal provision made, decisions can 
be “concluded” with no convincing argumentation or justifi cation to the depth presented; 
accordingly, with no indication of what exactly the normative basis for and framework of a 
given judgment were (Emmert 2001: 408). Or, it has to be realised again that formalism is a 
two-edge weapon, used also to both covering up and instigating absolutism, perhaps lurking 
untroubled behind.
Janus-facedness? In law? In Hungary, the hyper-activism of the formative era of 
constitutional adjudication may have been favourable for generating such a situation. As a 
matter of fact, the idol of formal legal certainty triumphed over all considerations on justice: 
both components (i.e., »law« and »to be ruled by«) of ‘the rule of law’ became emptied of 
morals and values, to institute in latter’s place extreme zigzagging between legal nihilism 
and textual fetishisation – the former denied as Socialist past, but transubstantiated into the 
latter as full embodiment of what they understood by “the rule of law” (Varga 2008). The 
result was a helpless dead-end, and a speedy rush for it at the same time. Like in America, 
wishing more and stricter regulation, albeit one has to drown in what is at disposal already.13
Over-politicisation was maybe believed to be surpassable by reducing rule of law into 
autotelic, self-serving formalism. In consequence, and especially when in-built interest was 
provided (especially in fi nancial matters persecuted as economic crimes), practical 
lawyering degenerated into search for gaps in the law. Whenever there was none, it was 
juridically constructed. There was no invocation to law [ius] but to the law [lex] instead; the 
new “rule of law” culture exhausted in fi nding the law, disadvantageous to the party of the 
case, either full of gaps or too general to get applied, and therefore unconstitutional. It 
ensued in effective administration and policing becoming wishful Utopianism. Any state 
action was rigidly made a function of some prior specifi cation in the law. Irresponsibility 
for common good and evaporation of the sense of duty were to replace any organic 
arrangement, albeit every actor claims to this day to be busy with nothing but “defence of 
rights”.
Albeit the meaning of ‘law’ itself is at stake, in terms of constitutionalism traced back 
to ‘constitutional rule-of-law’, to ‘division of powers’ and fi nally to well-operated ‘checks 
& balances’, the above situation can be characterised as the former’s practical negation: 
atomisation of the state’s institutional network, with each partner’s self-starring in rivalry 
for extending their relative weight and self-conceited competence, excelling by neophyte 
over-doing with no consideration to the merits of overall social effects, establishing, under 
the aegis of professional homogenisation accompanied and covered by full social and 
political irresponsibility, anarchy with public goods unrepresented. Accordingly, and for a 
while, national interest became unheard of and the nation, as such, defenceless. As to its 
style, mechanistic know-how technicism was to shadow the past memory of judicial 
Weisheit with the classical Holmes’ (1881: 1) wisdom on that “The life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience.”
13 Between 1990 and 1998, 894 parliamentary, 1635 governmental, and 2331 ministerial acts 
(all in all on 51.104 printed pages) – complemented by 501 constitutional court decisions – were 
issued in Hungary (Harmathy 1998: 790).
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Well, the English–American vision on how much the German Rechtsdogmatik is 
alienated a doctrine prognosticates the enmity by which even a German-type constitutional 
adjudication is received: sheer product of doctrinal erudition, where professional excellence 
is marked by neophytism, that is, by one master outreaching the other, and which, freed of 
practical considerations, will be unable to perceive the socially harmful excesses it reaches, 
thanks to mere intellectualism. What is lost is anything of empiricism, experience, and 
historical sense. In such a setting, perception of facts and contextures will have from the 
beginning been classifi ed in pre-conceptualised schemes: whatever experience, intuition, 
sense, or emotion can only be imagined as a simplifi ed replica of what has already been 
imagined and, as such, preserved in the individuals’ or their generations’ mental storehouse. 
With law, missing human environment conditioning – and conditioned by – it, justice 
disfi gures as law-automaton, impracticable to any purpose. And a law-automaton will allow 
to be posited within it exclusively that what offers axiomatic proof within it: what allows to 
be deduced from its notional web, called Rechtsdogmatik.
The intellectual landscape is like the one of Portalis, drafter of the Code civil. When 
having shocked by the spirit of coming revolution, he went in exile and started sensing the 
danger of anti-life doctrinarism of his compatriots: outstanding intellectuals called 
philosophers, representing res publica. Well, what was in Germany? Small circles, 
neutralising one another in rivalry. In France, in contrast, salon-fi gures of Paris agitated, 
competing unendingly with one another in abstractness and excessiveness. And after all, the 
intellectual storm they had engendered cumulated in untempered heroes’ mob actions. That 
is, according to his realisation already made, intellectualism with no responsibility can lead 
to whatever direction and cul-de-sac (Portalis 1834).
And indeed, nowadays, by the worldwide non-specifi ed over-use of ‘rule of law’, it 
has self-emptied, unable to serve as an operative term any longer (Ekin 2011), on the one 
hand, standing for (as opposed and made unavailable to common sense public reason) some 
mysterious artifi cial reason, decipherable only by those initiated from the beginning, i.e., 
professionals of some elite whose background interest may not converge with the one of 
any democratic majority constituency (Conklin 1998).
The basic situation is further complicated by the fact that besides ordinary judiciary 
(which, after WWII in Central and Eastern Europe, petrifi ed textual positivism that had 
ruled Western Europe before WWII) also constitutional courts were instituted: an activist 
super-forum with chances of mixed legal and political interventionism, ready to deduce a 
systemic network of principles from abstract terms of the constitution in order to build their 
own optional “invisible constitution”, which is used as a freely fl oating meta-level law 
serving as a criterion in control of law-making and law-applying as well (Varga 1995). In 
Hungary, the constitutional court has duelled with both the parliament and the supreme 
court of justice in its claim of superiority, a struggle that has failed fostering either 
interaction or cooperation to date. This is how the supreme (in practice, the exclusive) 
guardian of the Rule of Law can degenerate into the factual rule of some – free fl oating 
over anything of the positive law (Vörös 1999: 68) – tyranny itself.
Czech constitutional judiciary claimed exclusive competence in deliberation on legal 
abstractions where international human rights instruments were at stake, by expressed fear 
of interference on behalf of ordinary judiciary (403/2002 Sb.), as if there was one single 
national body to defend – from the rest – those international interests; as if even the bodies 
that made such interests relevant at all in their respective country would menace the said 
interests. Or, “ordinary” sources of the law are to be treated by “ordinary” courts, while 
“non-ordinary” sources, by “non-ordinary” (constitutional) courts (Kühn 2003). One 
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consequence is granted to take: in such places, European law remains alien to ordinary 
courts.
Albeit the European Court of Justice stated four decades ago that “where the 
Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the obligation to 
pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an act would be weakened if 
individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts and if the latter 
were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of Community law. Article 
177, which empowers national courts to refer to the Court questions concerning the validity 
and interpretation of all acts of the Community institutions, without distinction, implies 
furthermore that these acts may be invoked by individuals in the national courts. It is 
necessary to examine, in every case, whether the nature, general scheme and wording of the 
provisions in question are capable of having direct effects on the relations between Member 
States and individuals.”14 Accordingly, in this case it was echoed that once the last resort 
domestic court denies control by the European one on interpretation or consideration, it 
may be construed as unconstitutional, with no proper judge/judging allowed.
Poland
There have been ongoing debates in Poland on the autonomy of the judiciary in general and 
the law-making contribution of its decision-making in particular, this latter being unchanged 
denied in principle albeit tolerated in practice. As to the past, there was once a supreme 
court guiding decision that specifi ed state liability for a civil servant’s culpable act, not 
provided by the then valid Civil Code Article 417. Thirty years passed, and the constitutional 
court, without any entitlement either, overwrote it.15 The addressee supreme court reacted to 
such encroaching assistance by commenting that “Albeit interpretation of legal norms by 
the constitutional court has no binding force for the judiciary, it can be conceded in the 
present case that there is no reason why to doubt the interpretation given by it.”16
Clauses enacted during the time of Socialism – such as social co-existence and proper 
use of rights – have not been revocated or replaced, only simply re-interpreted as some 
normal continuation against changing times, with minor changes of shift in adaptation. 
Moreover, the outcome was heralded as “fundamental principles of ethical and worthy 
attitude”, “expressing the idea of equity in law and human liberty” (Dmowski & Rudnicki 
2002: 30).
The Polish style of judicial decision-making is seen as intermediary between the 
French and the German ones. It can be characterised by short and categorical formulations; 
an establishment in which there is no distinction between questions of fact and questions of 
law; and doctrinal issues involved are either simplistically short-cut (like the French one) or 
treated in the light of scholarly opinions and previous decisions (mostly of the supreme 
court), analysed in order to arrive at general conclusions (like the German one). The 
analysis of jurisprudence is done selectively and summarised in abstract conclusions – with 
no interest whatever in the very facts of the given case (unlike the English one) –, serving 
as an alibi illustration to the decision made. From those rare references to past law (or 
occasionally to the French or the Italian civil codes), genuine comparison is missing. The 
judgment is seen as standing for the offi cial response, excluding any idea of an alternative 
14 C-41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Offi ce (1974) ECR 1337, 12.
15 SK 18/00 Romuald K et al. v. Poland (2001), OTK Zbiór Urzędowy 8, 256.
16 IV CKN 178/01 Zbigniew S. v. Skarb Państwa et al. (2001) OSNC 7–8, 114, 117.
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solution and, of course, any dissent. Therefore justice and law are identifi ed, concluding 
from the procedure itself, which is deductive, legalistic, and magisterial (Mańko 2005: 
540–541). Or, “the attitude of courts is to represent a conclusion derived from the content 
of legal rules. The domination of arguments pro over arguments contra is one of the 
characteristic features of this style”. (Morawski & Zirk-Sadowski 1997: 225)
Accordingly, “one has the impression of reading the pleading for the prevailing party 
rather than a balanced opinion that takes all arguments into account”. (Mańko 2005: 541) 
Its language is professional, and its conclusion is reached through lawyers’ logic, with 
dogmas superimposed upon one another, in a depersonalised style, representing an 
authoritative state act and suggesting that “the law should give only one correct answer for 
every situation”. There are some new moments, notwithstanding. For instance, “Referring 
to ethical and economic reasons, and to the rules of rationality or social consequences, is a 
popular practice.” (Morawski & Zirk-Sadowski 1997: 226) At last but not least, some more 
continuity in time is proven by the fact that Latin maxims are unchanged willingly quoted 
in judgments.
Preparation for accession was a hard time to all new member states involved, with 
mixed success. For instance, contemporary criticism mentions “(often incorrect and 
careless) translation of directives [...] often [...] word for word, thereby introducing concepts 
which are not known to the Polish legal system. Alternative options are omitted – even 
when a Directive requires a choice between them”. (Czaplińsi 2001: 54)
Ordinary higher courts, however, started taking into consideration of both constitutional 
foundational principles and international law, even if a supreme administrative court 
decision (2000), quoting a European law “as the additional ground for the judgment”, 
criticised the practical want of the harmonisation of domestic law at a preparation time 
when European law was not to gain legal force in Polish domestic law.17 All that 
notwithstanding, the constitutional court stated early enough, in re of gender equality in 
civil service, that “Of course, EU law has no binding force in Poland. The Constitutional 
Tribunal wishes, however, to emphasize the provisions of Article 68 and Article 69 of the 
{Polish Association Agreement} [...]. Poland is thereby obliged to use ‘its best endeavours 
to ensure that future legislation is compatible with Community legislations’ [...]. The 
Constitutional Tribunal holds that the obligation to ensure compatibility of legislation 
(borne, above all, by the parliament and government) results also in the obligation to 
interpret the existing legislation in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of 
such compatibility.”18
As a next step, soon after association had been performed, the constitutional court 
rejected the criticism of election to the European Parliament based on the objection of 
unconstitutionality of the relevant Community regulation, considering the fact that the 
unchanged Polish constitution grants voting rights to Polish citizens exclusively. Excluding 
any construction of priority or confl ict between competing legal regimes, the court 
considered domestic constitution as “applicable directly to those structures of the Polish 
state exclusively through which the realisation of the interests of the republic is asserted”; 
stated that “domestic interpretation needs to keep the constitutional principle of assisting 
the European integration process and co-operation among states in mind”; paying attention 
17 SAC Senago (13 March 2000), published in Polish Yearbook of International Law 24 (1999–
2000), 217 et seq. at 219.
18 K. 15/97 in Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (1997) 19, 380 et seq., published in 
East European Case Reporter of Constitutional Law 5 (1998), 271 et seq. at 284.
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to that “Instead of generating or aggravating confl icts, the law’s long standing social 
function is their resolution.”19
Such evasion is in fact nothing but avoidance of the law. But it risks destroying the 
law’s ethos and thereby doing more harm in the long run as compared to some apparent 
tactical gain, collectible in the short run.
Czech/Slovak Republics
According to critics, the once Czechoslovakia was unblended with the spirit of “revolt 
against formalism” (Cappelletti 1989: 9); her getting stuck at the Austrian exegesis of the 
end of the 19th century meant passing by general principles of law and the express 
prohibition of judicial law-making. In general, “the interpretation of law was always 
presented as a simple cognitive operation [...and...] was always either a right or a wrong 
solution”, that is, conclusion was reached in a static manner and as an exclusive alternative 
(Kühn 2004: 543). Not even implementation of human rights have shaken those simplistic 
patterns repeated through decades and generations. “Unfortunately, since the fall of 
Communism the old philosophy of bound decision-making still continues to govern the 
judicial discourse and has even strengthened its formalist features.” For “Too often it seems 
that post-Communist judges hesitate to go into the merits of a case, preferring to dispose of 
the case on formal grounds.” (Kühn 2004: 550, 555)
Only their constitutional court challenged the underlying situation – in a struggle with 
the country’s supreme court, by the way –, nullifying a normative act, for instance, as it was 
“proven to be shiningly contradicting (owing to over-formalism) the principle of justice”.20 
As if constitutional adjudication as such was to transmit a message to administration of 
justice by ordinary courts, claiming that they are not “absolutely bound by the literal 
wording of a legal provision, as they can and must deviate therefrom if such a deviation is 
demanded by serious reasons of the law’s purpose, the history of its adoption, systematic 
reasons or any principle deriving from the constitutionally conforming legal order. [...] In 
doing so, it is necessary to avoid arbitrariness; the court decisions must be based on a 
rational argumentation”.21 Accordingly, if wrongs are to be cured, then all it has to mean 
that “legal enactments cannot be interpreted so dogmatically and non-conformably to the 
constitution as to de facto give rise […] to new injustices”.22 Otherwise speaking, it 
presupposes, while also concluding therefrom, that “legal enactments do, and must always, 
include within themselves the principles recognized as part of the democratic states 
governed by the rule of law”.23 Otherwise, it cannot be but a case of “mechanical application 
of the law [...that...] – whether disregarding the rationale and meaning of the legal norm 
intentionally or by ignorance – makes from the law an instrument of alienation and 
absurdity”.24
The president of the republic himself emphasised the need for a value-centred judicial 
decision-making. In the senate, at the occasion of the procedure for a constitutional judge 
19 K 15/04 (31 May 2005): 1 & III.2, published in Orzecsznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego 
Zbiór urzędowy, A, 5, 47, 655–668: 34, 10; 34, 9 (Kühn 2005: 573–574).
20 ÚS 15, 17, III. dec., ÚS 224/98.
21 ÚS 7 (1997), 87, Pl. dec., ÚS 21/96 (Kühn 2011: 200–201).
22 ÚS 3 (1995), 227, IV. ÚS 215/94 (Kühn 2011: 202).
23 ÚS 6 (1996), 249, IV. dec., ÚS 275/96 (Kühn 2011: 201).
24 ÚS 9, 399, Pl. dec., ÚS 33/97 (Kühn 2011: 201).
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nomination, he reclaimed that what is now prevailing “is mechanical, I would like to say 
senseless, application of law, which almost becomes an object of some cult. [...] It is an 
approach toward the application of law which does not permit any control by ordinary 
common sense; nor does it allow for any consideration for the law’s sense, meaning or 
circumstances, any consideration of the probable legislative intent or even the core of law’s 
value in a hard case. Although the law is a human product, it attains almost metaphysical 
authority”.25
Such was the basic situation the fact notwithstanding that the preparation to association 
was unprecedented in its rush ahead. Preceding the obligation of direct Union law 
application, for instance, the Olomouc high court rejected the Skoda Auto motion ignoring 
the European competition law regulation by declaring that “free market and especially 
antitrust law are [...] usually enriched by external law, which is an absolute necessity in the 
perspective of the harmonisation of laws of the European Community and the Czech 
Republic”.26 As a next step, the constitutional court re-affi rmed the identity of values and 
basic principles of both the European Union Act of Accession and the own constitution. 
Within some years – before the association had been performed and with direct reference to 
a European Court decision27 – it was confi rmed that “Primary Community law is not foreign 
law for the Constitutional Court, but to a wide degree it penetrates into the Court’s decision 
making – particularly in the form of general principles of European law.”28
At the same time, however – applying correctly the domestic law in force, half a 
decade before the European law should have had direct force – the supreme court declined 
reconsidering a contractual issue upon the plaintiff’s reference to good faith, as understood 
in Western Europe and the European Community. As it was explained, “validity of the 
agreement made [...] must be decided according to the then valid law, as both lower courts 
did. In contrast, laws and directives valid in the countries of the European Community are 
not applicable, as the Czech Republic was not (and still is not) a member of the Community, 
and that is why the Czech Republic is not bound by these laws. The binding force of the 
rules to which the appellant refers cannot be inferred from any provision of the {Czech 
Association Agreement}, as the court of appeal concluded. The question of harmonization 
of legal practice of the Czech Republic with legal practice of the European Community is 
gaining in, but this cannot change anything in the outcome of this case”.29 Before accession 
– and, conformingly, “considering the present phase of the European integration” – 
Slovakia’s supreme court also resisted the direct application of a European directive.30
25 Václav Havel in ČTK (14 March 2002) (Kühn 2011: 227).
26 2A6/96 (14 November 1996) in Právni rozhledy 5 (1997) 9, 484–.
27 C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA (1991) ECR 
I-5889.
28 410/2001 Re Milk Quota, electronically available at: www.concourt.cz (Kühn 2005: 567–
568).
29 25 Cdo 314/99 (12 December 2000), electronically available at: www.nsoud.cz.
30 76/2000 (25 August 1999), published in Zbierka stanovísk Najvyššieho súdu a rozhodnutí 
súdov Slovenskej republiky 4 (2000), 55.
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Baltic Republics
Critical overviews report on judicial practice narrowly and infl exibly following the letter of 
the law. There was no place for active judicial mentality, sensitively weighing and balancing, 
as well as complementing and adapting the law, under the all-Soviet sun.
For instance, the Estonian civil code (1965) had no clause of good faith. As a matter of 
fact, it was only introduced by the 1st Paragraph, Article 108, of the new code’s general part 
– in force from 1 September 1994 – as a provision tentatively generating new jurisprudence 
step by step, which became visible by the turn of the Millennium only (Krull 2000: 122). At 
the same time, unjustifi ed enrichment is not posited in the code, so there is no caveat 
referring to it either. Not even their supreme court is toiling with general principles of law, 
so – as a typically American commercial lawyer was led to remark that – what prevailed 
there was “an extreme form of legal positivism [...which...] may result in unjust rulings or 
even a complete denial of justice”. (Emmert 2001: 406)
As to the relationship between European law and domestic law during the pre- and the 
post-accession phase, it is reported that judicial fora in Lithuania took into consideration, as 
an instance guiding judicial interpretation, European provisions regarding competition and 
copyright law well before her association. At the same time, however, the normative 
foundations of direct application have not been cleared up enough. Accordingly, pre-
accession practice has continued further on more or less unchanged, transforming the earlier 
pattern into a retroactive one (Goldammer & Matulionytė 2006: 270).
As to Estonia, the supreme court is said to frequently deny both preliminary questions 
to be addressed to the European Court and the European law to be applied in constitutional 
adjudication. In that respect, a formal justifi cation is usually forwarded and in a most logical 
manner, according to which there is no domestic competence for doing so, regarding that 
neither the constitution nor the European community law has any relevant provision.31
The situation in Latvia and Lithuania is even more clear-cut as European statistics 
have not known about preliminary questions forwarded from these new member states.
Croatia
Croatia is self-characterised as a specimen of legal culture expressedly positivistic and 
formalistic, identifi ed with the pattern within which law is conceived of, and treated as, a 
self-fulfi lling end to be taken in itself.
It is striking even in a Central European perspective that courts there have never raised 
the issue of the laws’ constitutionality; judgments are not published; case law is unknown; 
and in want of any form of law-reporting, past and present judicial decisions are not 
refl ected or commented upon by anyone. Concludingly, those taking part in the everyday 
administration of justice do not consider themselves either professionally or sociologically 
competent to role-play an expert offering de lege lata or de lege ferenda opinions merging 
on law in force, as if there were not, and could not even be, reverse link from law-
application to law-making (Ćapeta 2005).
Before a case is decided on the last resort – a chance that may take several years in 
consequence of chronically long delays – any public word on them would qualify, as undue 
interference, a specifi ed crime.32
31 3-4-1-1-05 (4 November 2006) (Ginter 2006: 919).
32 Croatian criminal code (Narode novine 110/1997, resp. 111/2003), section 309.
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At the same time, however, the Croatian constitutional court is rather active in 
enforcing the European Convention of Human Rights. Domestic law confl icting to whatever 
international agreement is sanctioned as a violation of the principle of the rule of law, 
henceforth the very idea of confl ict is rejected as it could only qualify as unconstitutional.33
True, professionals in Croatia know that any option for an accelerated path of 
development needs certain caution. For, especially in law, instruments and 
institutionalisations can prove to be a two-edge weapon. The very personality of justices 
who are “liberated” from traditional professional limitations through the reduction of their 
old patterns of rigorous argumentation and justifi cation to a licence of creative invention at 
please, may have negative repercussion that, in want of suffi cient tradition in the 
background, will remain hard to control by sheerly normative regulative means. Gospić 
town court, in a genocide case, established the fact, for instance, that “Serbs have happened 
to murder Croats for half a millennium”.34 Well, such a legacy is obviously setting back the 
development of judicial ingenuity, a circumstance that, as a counter effect, may give a place 
to the upvaluation of practical lawyers’ skill and ingenuity, especially in hard cases.
Phases lag? Belatedness? All this may at most be relative, a function of the adopted 
point of view. As a by-effect, they can easily turn to become expressedly positive, by 
preserving skills and sensitivities which may be especially useful at a time when other 
cultures will leave them behind. For instance, “Thus, paradoxically, the positivism and 
formalism of Eastern European judges may sometimes make them ‘good European judges’, 
i.e. judges who faithfully apply Community law” – in contrast to present-day mostly 
standardised Western European practice which is apt to question (as an issue of validity or 
effect) the basis, legitimation, or fi eld of operation, of the provisions to be applied of the 
European law (Ćapeta 2005: 16).
IV. PERSPECTIVES
The variety of practices relating to the new – once Socialist – members of the European 
Union induces reconsideration. For the association agreements themselves (taken de lege 
lata, i.e., without a critical – de lege ferenda – view of the chance of their improper 
preparation) have in no case foreseen harmonisation of domestic and EU laws to be 
enforced when justice is administered preceding the time of the legal act of actual joining, 
so all those divergences notwithstanding, their variety may have rightly covered the original 
intention of both parties. Moreover, enforcing anticipatory harmonisation of the normative 
grounds of domestic judicial decision-making with no due authorisation in its underlying 
(valid) law could only be a neophyte over-fulfi lment within the process of association, with 
the negative side effect (overshadowing the short run gain of early adaptation) that it may 
have in fact impaired the sine qua non absolutism of the very idea of the Rule of Law and, 
as a part of it, legal certainty, thereby also debilitating, in a paradoxical manner, the idea of 
constitutionalism, too, which had once been expected to substantiate the entire undertaking 
as the upmost reason for change at all.
The foundational realisation is that the European Union is marching on and further on 
in time as a characteristic big organisation after our region’s accession as well. Accordingly, 
it seldom recourses to issuing directly applicable and enforceable provisions and detailed 
33 U-I-920/1955 and U-I-950/1966 (15 July 1998) (Narodne novine 41/1998) (Rodin 2002).
34 No. I KŽ 862/03-8 (29 January 2004).
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regulations drafted within some well-ordained normative framework, save specifi c 
emergencies. In average cases, it entrusts the progress of effective integration to the 
workings of its big structure and total motion, as well as the mutuality between the EU and 
its member states, which, well-tried, already has stood the test of time, that is, the skill of 
how to manage tensions and their resolution, which are necessarily to form in the process. 
That is, the organisational idea, apparatus and technicality conceived of as the chance of 
having an “order out of chaos” has been proven the most successful enterprise the humanity 
has ever erected and experienced in its long – and known – history (Varga 2009).
The European law – alongside with the overwhelming mass of the judicial acquis 
communautaire  – gains normative force for the countries joined from the Central and 
Eastern European region from May 2004 on; this is clearly stated by the Act of Accession 
(Article 2) and sanctioned by the European Court: “From the date of accession”.
There is a moment of impatience and subjective exaggeration in the fact that local 
professional literature treats the issue of pre-accession observance/non-observance of 
European law by local domestic courts in terms of persuasive force (traditional in the 
American precedential regime, used to distinguish the former from the precedents’ 
expressedly binding force), only in order to vilify the genuinely law-abiding pattern of 
those judicial fora which reject mixing, in their legal procedure, what is considered to be 
law and what is simply non-law (or, perhaps the promise of some future law at the most) at 
a given place and time, criticising, for instance, cases where preference is given to the 
application of the offi cial law as “directly effective” valid normative ground, instead of 
something airy – at least, to some, persuasive, according to personal tastes – soft law (Týć 
2001: 231). Albeit all such instances, bourgeoning in the region in question, can only 
exemplify on the fi nal analysis nothing else than disintegration of discipline, bounds and 
traditions of the legal profession, moreover, at a momentous time when its underlying legal 
culture is to face inorganic transfer of a mass of external laws. For, as it is known, in 
cultures of Civil Law exclusively what is made normative (formally valid) by a directly 
effective source of the law (and promulgated accordingly) can at all be enforced in the 
name of law. And what can be termed ‘persuasive’ is simply non-law in a Civil Law system, 
knowing no precedents and no softening processes either, able to replace – by breaking 
through – the idea of systemic building in both deduction and justifi cation.
To arrogate as binding anything at most ‘persuasive’ is contradictio in adiecto from 
the beginning, far from “isolationism” in itself, with which it is far too often accused. For 
the situation is clear: the legislator could do anything but refraine actually from doing that. 
Its odium, if there is one, must not be transferred to the judiciary. It is ironical to teach, in a 
process of transitioning from a dictatorship, without scruples again that in a state where 
courts are powered to entitle themselves to initiate any path to take, independently of 
whether or not their initiative is covered – justifi ed and legitimated – by the law, well, that 
such unbound discretion will necessarily turn to become creative in all directions, generating 
legal uncertainty on borderline of sheer despotism. This is next to judgeocracy stricto sensu, 
where any genuine “checks & balances” within the division of powers is already waned 
away (Hirschl 2004; also the Czech President Václas Klaus in Loužek 2006). Thereby such 
instances of pioneering post-modernists’ fundamentalism, also derived by the mainstream 
catch-word “constitutionalism”, raises doubt in that whether constitutionalism has at all a 
defi nite meaning, usable as an operative term, or not (cf. Fallon 1997).
As is known, not even Community law provides express ordering for the topic. Three 
decades ago, the European Court stated in general (and in a way irrelevant for those in the 
process of association still) in re of a somewhat analogical issue that “Although in general 
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the principle of legal certainty precludes a Community measure from taking effect from a 
point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to 
be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly 
respected”35 And, to be sure, Community law has no category of “those awaiting, and 
preparing for, association” or “those learning, and preparing for, the EU law”. In addition to 
their specifi c Act of Accession, common regulation concerns their activity as well. 
Accordingly, one may state that what is particular and also detrimental in the region’s 
contemporary development is by far not revolving around whether or not transition process 
is hustle and runs ahead, passing over limitations set by domestic law, but the region’s 
overall belatedness, that is, its too late detachment – providing that it has happened at all 
and has been crowned with success at all – from the Soviet-type Communism once imposed 
upon it.
This is also to say that in addition to individual success by which a sophisticated or 
crude variety of “dictatorship of the proletariat” subdued the particular legal regime to 
follow imported patterns, what really matters is the added – secondary – effect: the phases-
lag of judicial methodology. For, while Muscovite Marxism petrifi ed “bourgeois” legal 
positivism of the fi rst part of the 20th century, the countries in question became necessarily 
deprived of Western professional re-orientation in the meantime: (1) post-WWII moral 
renaissance, (2) criteriality of natural law (with the “nature of things”), (3) fertilisation of 
practice by general clauses and principles, as well as with concern for human rights, and (4) 
the constitutionalisation of issues. Accordingly, the gap to be bridged is not so much the one 
between the pre-World War II period and contemporary law but the one between own past, 
preserved in professional memory, of last pre-WWII democratic achievements and post-
WWII Western continental judicial patterns and methodologies, reshaped in the meantime.
This haunts today and will continue haunting in our near common future as well. 
Concludingly, for a given period the region’s legal culture will feature some otherness 
within the European Union. Moreover, as adapted locally, also Community law and 
integration will have, in local adaptation/materialisation, some regional determination.
All this comes true without the law of the European Union foreseeing or authorising 
anything like to occur. But the path to be covered is a great challenge indeed, and it is only 
viable if backed by proper dedication. Also it is to be remembered that any exigency of 
following external patterns may be accompanied, as usual corollary, by both longing for 
perfection and inertia, keeping the organicity of local pasts somewhat alive – with the 
chance of laziness as well, with remnants traceable also in big moves.
Or, eventually, there is one job to perform: transcending past by both bringing its 
historical account and promising perspectives for such a venture. It should not to be a l’art 
pour l’art programme nor mere praying-mill repetition of a mantra, able to generate magic 
effect somehow. There is a common future to be built in common, with all professions 
involved. Providing that it would fail, added burdens might dislocate the process. It could 
deprive the whole process of perspectives, bringing down participation in one common 
Europe a sheer formalism.
35 C-98/78 Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz (1979) ECR 69, 20 at 86 as well as C-99/78 Decker v. 
Hauptzollamt Landau (1979) ECR 101, 8 at 111.
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